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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
A FIDUCIARY'S DUTY OF LOYALTY
By ROGER A. CIAPP*
Some years ago a trustee was confronted with this sit-
uation: Among the assets of his trust estate was a valu-
able lease. At the expiration of the term the trustee at-
tempted to renew the lease for the benefit of the estate.
The lessor, however, had doubts as to the responsibility
of a trust estate as a lessee and refused to renew. Believ-
ing that he had fulfilled his entire duty to the estate, the
trustee renewed the lease in his own name and for his own
benefit. Probably much to his surprise, a court of equity
later held that he had acted wrongly in the matter and
required him to hold the lease for the benefit of the estate.
In the course of his opinion the Chancellor said:
"This may seem hard, that the trustee is the only
person of all mankind who might not have the lease:
but it is very proper that rule should be strictly pur-
sued, and not in the least relaxed; for it is very obvi-
ous what would be the consequences of letting trus-
tees have the lease on refusal to renew to cestui que
use."
,
The facts stated are those of Keech v. Sanford' decided
in 1726. Although the trustee was not accused of fraud
or bad faith, he was held to have violated his duty as a fidu-
ciary and as such was required in this case to abide by a
decree exemplary in effect.
Trustees, executors and administrators, guardians,
agents, partners, joint adventurers, corporate directors,
pledgees, and attorneys are all fiduciaries.2 The standard
required of them varies as the confidential nature of their
position varies, but the primary duty of all is loyalty to
the person for whom they are acting. This duty of loyalty
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; A.B., 1931, Oberlin College; LL.B., 1934,
Harvard Law School.
1 Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 (1726).
'See Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521,
for an exhaustive treatment of the subject with reference to trustees. The
authorities in Maryland dealing with agents are collected in the Maryland
Annotations to the Restatement of the Law: Agency, Sees. 387-398.
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extends to every incident of their position and requires
of them an unbending adherence. The courts are not con-
tent to require that the fiduciary act honestly and in good
faith, but do not even permit him to occupy a position in
which his personal interests and his duty as a fiduciary
might conflict. In a leading Maryland case8 the Court of
Appeals said: "Remembering the weakness of humanity,
its liability to be seduced, by self-interest, from the straight
line of duty, the sages of the law inculcate and enjoin, a
strict observance of the divine precept: 'Lead us not into
temptation' ". Since this is the basis of the doctrine, the
motives of the fiduciary are immaterial.' The law sets up
an objective standard and will not undertake to determine
whether the fiduciary in any particular case acted solely
for personal gain or profit, or whether his- motives were
proper.
Although a fiduciary is held to a standard higher than
that required of others, he is not entirely forbidden to
deal with those for whom he is acting. If the beneficiaries
are sui juris and fully advised of the facts the fiduciary
may deal with them. Even in such cases the fiduciary may
not act at arm's length but must treat the beneficiary fairly,
and if the transaction is questioned, the fiduciary has the
burden of proving that it was fair.
I. PURCHASE By THE FIDUCiARY INDIVIDUALLY
A fiduciary who has property in his hands for sale may
not purchase the property at his own sale, unless the bene-
ficiary5 consents or subsequently ratifies the transaction.
This rule has been applied to trustees," executors and ad-
' Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland C. & I. Co., 16 Md. 456, 77
A. D. 311 (1860).
' Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 A. D. 779 (1866);
Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191 (1934) ; Carey v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co., 168 Md. 501, 178 A. 242 (1935).
5 For want of a better term the word "beneficiary" is used throughout to
designate the person for whom a fiduciary acts.
6 Dorsey v. Dorsey, 3 H. & J. 410, 6 A. D. 506 (1810) : Ringgold v. Ring-
gold, 1 H. & G. 11, 18 A. D. 250 (1826); Richardson v. Jones, 3 G. & J. 163,
22 A. D. 293 (1831) ; Mason v. Martin, 4 Md. 124 (1853) ; North Balto. Bldg.
Assn. v. Caldwell, 25 Md. 420, 90 A. D. 67 (1866) ; Korns v. Shaffer, 27 Md.
83 (1867) ; Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368, 92 A. D. 637 (1867) ; Pairo V.
Vickery, 37 Md. 467 (1873).
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ministrators,7 agents,' attorneys, 9 pledgees, 0 corporate di-
rectors," partners,"2 and joint adventurers."8  The rule is
enforced even though the sale is at public auction." At
such a sale the fiduciary may be required to exercise his
discretion and withdraw the property if the bids are too
low and, as the active vendor, he is in a position to dis-
courage prospective bidders if he desires to bid in the
property himself.
This rule was firmly established by the courts at an
early date. In a case decided in 1820," the Court of Ap-
peals said: "That a trustee cannot purchase at his own
sale in person, or by another, and when it is done, that
the act is deemed fraudulent, is law too well understood at
this day to be controverted." In these cases the good in-
tentions of the fiduciary are not considered since the doc-
trine is enforced as a matter of public policy "to remove
all temptation from the trustee to promote his own interest
by violating the trust." 6
Not all purchases by fiduciaries are improper. By stat-
ute a mortgagee is permitted to bid in the mortgaged prop-
erty at a foreclosure sale.'" A fiduciary who has termi-
nated the relationship may purchase the property as well
as any other. In Peters v. Speights, s the defendant was
the master and part-owner of a vessel with a power of sale
from the other owner. This power of sale was revoked
7 Conway v. Green, 1 H. & J. 151 (1801) ; Turner v. Bouchell, 3 H. & J.
99 (1810) ; Singstack v. Harding, 4 H. & J. 186, 7 A. D. 669 (1815) ; Davis
v. Simpson, 5 H. & J. 147, 9 A. D. 500 (1820) ; Scott v. Burch, 6 H. & J. 67
(1823); Williams v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 376 (1832) ; Eichelberger v. Haw-
thorne, 33 Md. 588, 3 A. R. 211 (1871) ; McLean v. Maloy, 136 Md. 467, 111
A. 91 (1920) ; Sessions v. Casey, 141 Md. 312, 118 A. 759 (1922).8 Keighler v. Savage Mfg. Co., 12 Md. 383, 71 A. D. 600 (1858); Wood-
cock v. Dennis, 199 A. 845 (Md. 1938).
9 Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513 (1875) ; Merryman v. Euler, 59 Md. 588, 43
A. R. 564 (1883) ; McLean v. Maloy, 136 Md. 467, 111 A. 91 (1920).
10 Maryland Fire Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 242, 89 A. D. 779 (1866).11 Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland C. & I. Co., 16 Md. 456, 77 A. D.
311 (1860) ; Cumberland C. & I. Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117 (1863).
Is Welbourn v. Kleinle, 92 Md. 114,48 A. 81 (1900).
,' Ricketts v. Montgomery, 15 Md. 46 (1860).
14 See cases supra notes 6 and 7.
Davis v. Simpson, 5 H. & J. 147, 9 A. D. 500 (1820).
' Mason v. Martin, 4 Md. 124 (1853).
17 Md. Code, Art. 66, Sec. 14.
1- 4 Md. Ch. 375 (1853).
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and given to another who sold the vessel to the defendant.
The defendant was not required to account for the profit
which he made upon a resale at a better price. In such
cases the burden of proof is on the fiduciary to show that
the relationship has been terminated.19 It frequently hap-
pens that a fiduciary may purchase property in which he
has an interest, not only as a fiduciary but also as an in-
dividual. In two cases20 involving sales made in lieu of
partition, it appeared that the purchaser at the respective
sales had an individual interest in the property and also
an interest as trustee. The sales were allowed to stand
in both cases. One obvious distinction, however, is that
in neither case did the fiduciary conduct the sale. Al-
though there was a very real conflict of interest, evidently
the court felt that the danger to the beneficiaries was too
remote.
In a recent case 21 an executor sold property at public
sale and purchased it in his capacity as trustee under the
will. When an assignee of some of the beneficiaries under
the will objected, the Court held that since the purchase
was made for the benefit of the beneficiaries, it could stand
provided the executor showed that it was fairly made and
that the price was adequate. It is true that not all of the
beneficiaries were benefited, but those who were had to
rely upon the fiduciary for protection. From a practical
standpoint they would not be in as good a position to pro-
tect their interests in the estate by bidding at the sale as
those who received their bequests outright. As trustee
under the will, the fiduciary might well have been under
a duty to act as he did.
Sales made by fiduciaries to themselves are not void,
but are merely voidable. Here a distinction is drawn be-
tween those cases in which the beneficiary does not know
that the fiduciary was the purchaser at the sale and those
in which the beneficiary had this knowledge. In the first
29 Woodcock v. Dennis, 199 A. 845 (Md. 1938).
20 Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 400, 29 A. 611 (1894) ; Whitely v. Whitely,
117 Md. 538, 84 A. 68 (1912).
21 Harlan v. Lee, 199 A. 862 (Md. 1938).
"2 But see Singstack v. Harding, 4 H. & J. 186, 7 A. D. 669 (1815).
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situation the beneficiary has an election to avoid the sale
or affirm it. If the fiduciary has resold the property at a
profit, he may be required to account to the beneficiary for
this profit.2" In Woodcock v. Dennis" the plaintiff em-
ployed the defendant to act as a real estate agent in the
sale of a farm. The defendant reported a sale to a third
person which was accepted, and title passed. On the same
day the property was resold at a profit by the third per-
son. The third person took no beneficial interest in the
property but merely held title for the defendant. The
Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
profit made by the defendant on the resale of the property.
If the property has been sold by the fiduciary to one who
is not a bona fide purchaser for value, he may be required
to return the property to the beneficiary.25
In all these cases the election must be made by the bene-
ficiary; neither the fiduciary26 nor the third person may
avoid the sale. The beneficiary may ratify the sale, but
if his ratification is to be effective, he must be sui juris and
must know all the facts connected with the sale and the
legal effect of such facts. 28 This last requirement is a good
illustration of the strictness of the courts in dealing with
these situations. In the case cited, the court held that the
ratification by stockholders of the purchase of corporate
property by a director was not effective unless the stock-
holders had complete knowledge of the transaction, includ-
ing the knowledge that they had the legal right to rescind.
Although a fiduciary is not permitted to make a profit
from his position, he is not penalized gratuitously. If the
beneficiary elects to avoid the sale, he must return to the
fiduciary the purchase price and compensate him for per-
manent improvements and additions to the property made
28 Ricketts v. Montgomery, 15 Md. 46 (1860); Woodcock v. Dennis, 199
A. 845 (Md. 1938).
2' 199 Atl. 845 (Md. 1938).
21 Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 3 A. R. 211 (1871).
'e Richardson v. Jones, 3 G. & J. 163, 22 A. D. 293 (1831).
"Williams v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 376 (1832).
itsHoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland C. & I. Co., 16 Md. 456, 77
A. D. 311 (1860).
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in good faith.2 9 The usual equitable defenses such as laches
and estoppel are also available to the fiduciary.s0
In those cases in which the beneficiary has knowledge
of the fact that the fiduciary is selling to himself and does
not object, his rights are different. A sale thus made is
not voidable at the option of the beneficiary, but can be
upset only if the fiduciary took advantage of his position.
If the transaction was completely disclosed, and the bene-
ficiary treated fairly, it will stand. However, when such
a transaction is questioned, the fiduciary has the burden of
proving that it was proper under all the circumstances.8 1
In such cases the beneficiary makes out a prima facie case
by showing that the fiduciary purchased the property in-
dividually. On the other hand the fiduciary is permitted to
defend by showing that the price paid was fair and that
he took no advantage of the beneficiary by reason of his
position. Whether the sale is allowed to stand in such
cases depends upon the facts in the particular case. Here
also a beneficiary who knowingly permits a fiduciary to
change his position by improving the property may be es-
topped from raising subsequent objections.
Thus, in McLean v. Maloy 2 the fiduciary was an execu-
tor who purchased stock in a corporation formed for the
purpose of purchasing property of the estate. The bene-
ficiaries were aware of this at the time the transaction was
consummated. They rested on their rights until the newly
formed company made substantial payments under the
purchase contract and then brought a bill to require the
executor to account for any profits he might have made.
During this entire period the beneficiaries were represented
by independent counsel. The Court held that under the
" Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368, 92 A. D. 637 (1867) ; ]ichelberger V.
Hawthorne, 33 Md. 588, 3 A. R. 211 (1871).30 Williams v. Marshall, 4 G. & J. 376 (1832). Cf. McLean v. Maloy, 136
Md. 467, 111 A. 91 (1920).81 Smith v. Townshend, 27 Md. 368, 92 A. D. 637 (1867) ; (trustee) ; Pairo
v. Vickery, 37 Md. 467 (1873) (trustee) ; Roman v. Mali, 42 Md. 513 (1875)
(attorney) ; Merryman v. P-uler, 59 Md. 588, 43 A. R. 564 (1883) (attor-
ney) ; Welbourn v. Klelnle, 92 Md. 114, 48 A. 81 (1900) (partner) ; McLean
v. Maloy, 136 Md. 467, 111 A. 91 (1920) (attorney and administrator);
Buechner v. Goodman & Glick, 197 A. 586 (Md. 1938).
s' 136 Md. 467, 111 A. 91 (1920).
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circumstances the beneficiaries had ratified the agreement
and were estopped from questioning its validity.
II. SALE OF FmucIAaY's INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY To HIMSELF
As FIDUCIARY
Just as it is improper for a fiduciary to sell the bene-
ficiary's property to himself, so it is equally improper for
him to use the funds of the beneficiary to purchase prop-
erty belonging to himself. The opportunity for self in-
terest to color the fiduciary's judgment is fully apparent.
Only two cases of this sort have been found in Mary-
land. In the first a guardian invested funds of his ward
in a promissory note executed by the guardian. The Court
held that this was not a proper investment and that the
order of the Orphans' Court approving it was erroneous.88
In the second case the promoters and directors of a cor-
poration sold certain real estate to it for a consideration
of about $500,000 which had cost them not over $70,000.
The Court held that the corporation had the right to re-
scind this sale if it desired. 4
The rule governing these cases seems to be similar to
that governing cases where the fiduciary purchases at his
own sale. The beneficiary has an election to avoid the trans-
action if he desires. The Court of Appeals has not as yet
dealt with a case in which the beneficiary had notice that
the fiduciary was purchasing from himself or ratified the
purchase after such notice. On principle it would seem
that the rules governing sales made by the fiduciary to
himself would apply.
III. USE OF PROPERTY FOR THE FIDUCIARY'S
OwN PURPOSE
Since a fiduciary is not permitted to make a profit by
reason of his position, it is obvious that he cannot use the
property of the beneficiary for his own purposes. An ex-
ample of such neglect of duty would be the case of a
3Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 80 A. 603 (1911).
"Urner v. Sollenberger, 89 Md. 316, 43 A. 810 (1899).
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trustee of shore property which included a ducking blind,
who used the blind himself instead of leasing it. Similar
cases have arisen in England, but none has been found in
Maryland.35 In one case a trustee was permitted to lease
trust property for use as his home over the objections of
his co-trustee.8 6 However, it appeared that the settlor
had permitted the trustee to occupy this property during
her lifetime so that the decision was based on the intention
of the settlor. The court intimated that without such au-
thority from the settlor this would have been improper.
IV. PURCHASE OF ADVERSE INTEREST FROM THIRD PERSON
"He who accepts a trust takes it for the benefit of the
persons for whom he is trusted and not to benefit himself. 37
For this reason a fiduciary who purchases from a third
person an adverse interest in the beneficiary's property
is not permitted to retain it; instead he is required to hold
it for the benefit of the beneficiary. Thus a fiduciary who
purchases a mortgage on the estate at a discount holds it
for the beneficiary at the price which he paid, rather than
its face amount.8 s The same rule is enforced in case of
purchase at execution sales, 9 tax sales,4" and other in-
stances where a fiduciary procures a claim against his
trust estate at a discount.4 1 The beneficiary must reim-
burse the fiduciary for the amount he has expended in
making the purchase, but the fiduciary may not make a
profit. In these cases also the beneficiary may be barred
by laches or estoppel.42
The fact that the beneficiary has an interest in the prop-
erty is not sufficient to preclude the fiduciary's dealing with
it. In order that this principle may apply the property
must be held by the fiduciary for the benefit of the benefi-
31 See cases collected in Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty (1936) 49
Harv. L. Rev. 521, 546.8 6 Whitelock v. Dorsey, 121 Md. 497, 88 A. 241 (1913).
17 Turner v. Bouchell, 3 H. & J. 99 (1810).3 5 Ibid .
19Callis v. Ridout, 7 G. & J. 1 (1834) ; Bell v. Webb, 2 Gill 163 (1844).;
Spindler v. Atkinson, 3 Md. 409, 56 A. D. 755 (1852).40 Cf. Love v. Rogers, 118 Md. 525, 85 A. 771 (1912).
' Garey v. Hignutt, 32 Md. 552 (1870).
"Love v. Rogers, 118 Md. 525, 85 A. 771 (1912).
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ciary. Thus a trustee for the benefit of creditors was per-
mitted to purchase and foreclose a mortgage made by the
debtor prior to the date of the deed of trust and thus not
held by the trustee as a part of the trust estate."s
In Parks v. Skipper4' an attorney purchased certain
mortgages previously made by his sister whom he had
represented without compensation. His administrator was
permitted to recover from the sister in a suit on the mort-
gages. The court recognized the principle that an attor-
ney may not acquire an interest in the property of his
client for his own advantage and to the prejudice of his
client, but held that it was not applicable under these cir-
cumstances.
V. RECEIPT OF BoNusEs, COMMISSIONS, COMPENSATION
Although a fiduciary is generally entitled to compensa-
tion from the trust estate for his work, he is not permitted
to accept additional compensation or commissions from
persons with whom he deals in performing his fiduciary
duties. Thus a fiduciary, who is employed to buy or sell
real estate, may not receive a share of the commissions
usually paid by the adverse party for such sales.45 For
the same reason a fiduciary may not receive a commission
for investing the funds of the estate from the person to
whom he lends the funds or purchases the investment."
The trustee in Carey v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.47 was
required to account for "commissions" paid by mortgagors
to whom he loaned trust funds.
In not allowing the fiduciary to receive such compensa-
tion, the law seeks to remove any possibility that his ac-
tion may be determined by his own interests. For this
reason the rule is enforced even though it may be shown
that the fiduciary acted in good faith.48 Where the fidu-
,a Read v. Reynolds, 100 Md. 284, 59 A. 669 (1905).
"164 Md. 388, 165 A. 543 (1933).
45 Croft Lumber Co. v. Bond, 119 Md. 687, 87 A. 264 (1913) ; De Crette v.
Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 127 A. 639 (1925).
6Carey v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 501, 178 A. 242 (1935).
Cf. Tippett v. Myers, 127 Md. 527, 96 A. 678 (1916).
" Ibid.
8 Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191 (1934).
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ciary is not acting in good faith, the rule is obviously ap-
plied.49
The extent of the duty of a fiduciary who by reason of
his position is elected an officer of a corporation and is
paid a salary has been considered in several cases. Man-
gels v. Tippet 50 dealt with a trustee of a large block of
stock who was elected director and secretary of the cor-
poration, and paid a salary for his services. The Court
held that he should be required to return the amount of
the salary to the trust estate, although there was no evi-
dence that the salary was excessive or that the services
of the trustee were inadequate.
On the other hand, in Dailey v. Wight 1 relief was denied
to a beneficiary who petitioned the court to remove a trus-
tee on the ground that he had improperly voted to pay him-
self a large salary as an officer of a corporation whose stock
he held as trustee. It appeared that the estate held two-
ninths of the stock but that the trustee individually held
a majority and that the trustee had been selected by the
settlor so that the stock would continue to be closely held.
The distinction in this case seems to be that the fiduciary
did not receive the salary by reason of his position but by
reason of his individual holdings. A conflict of interest
was present, but the result must have been contemplated
by the settlor.
The same distinction was followed in Adams v. Hearn.2
In this case an executrix held 2,457 shares of stock out of a
total issue of 2,500. She was beneficially entitled to one-
half of the shares held by the estate and the remaining 43
shares were held by third persons. The executrix by vot-
ing the stock of the estate was unanimously elected presi-
dent of the company and was paid a large salary. She
neglected to close the estate and distribute the stock but
continued to act as president and receive a salary until her
death four years later. The complainant, who also was
" Refining Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., 83 Md. 36, 34 A. 243, 369 (1896);
Hambleton v. Rhind, 84 Md. 456, 36 A. 597, 40 L. R. A. 216 (1897).4o 167 Md. 290, 173 A. 191 (1934).
5194 Md. 269, 51 A. 38 (1902).
5'168 Md. 544, 178 A. 606 (1935).
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beneficially entitled to half the shares held by the estate,
brought a bill to require an accounting of the salary re-
ceived by the executrix while acting as president of the
company. In holding that her election as president was
proper the Court said :5
"It will be noted, from the above quoted extracts,
that a distinction is drawn between cases wherein the
fiduciary is elected to a position of profit in a cor-
poration by voting stock pertaining to his trust es-
tate, without the votes of which he could not be elect-
ed, and cases wherein stock pertaining to the trust
estate is not necessary for his election."
Corporate directors who vote themselves salaries as
officers are also treated as fiduciaries." From the nature
of their position they are not required to serve as officers
without compensation, but they do have the burden of prov-
ing that the salaries are fair.
VI. COMPETITION WITH THE BENEFICIARY
Since a fiduciary is required to act at all times for the
best interests of the beneficiary, it is a breach of his duty
to compete as an individual with himself as a fiduciary. In
Keech v. Sanford5 the trustee who renewed the lease in
his own name was required to hold it for the beneficiary.
In Maryland the same rule was applied in Acker, Merrall
& Condit Co. v. McGaw.8 McGaw who was an employee
and director of the plaintiff corporation secured in his own
name a renewal of the lease of property occupied by the
plaintiff's store with the expressed intention of going into
business at this location for himself. The Court held that
he was liable for any loss caused by his breach of duty.
It seems clear that the plaintiff corporation could have se-
cured an assignment of the lease if it had desired such
relief.5 7
" Ibid, 168 Md. 544, 556.
5, Francis v. Brigham Hopkins Co., 108 Md. 233, 70 A. 95 (1908).
51 Keech v. Sanford, 1 Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 (1726).
50106 Md. 536, 68 A. 17 (1907).
57 See case cited 8upra n. 25.
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The Acker case was not followed where an agent who
was employed to prepare plans for a building later pur-
chased for himself the lot on which it was proposed to
erect the building.58 The agent, of course, was not em-
ployed to purchase the land. However, it is submitted that
an agent even for a limited purpose should not be permit-
ted to profit by an action directly contrary to the interests
of his employer.
A partner is also treated as a fiduciary and as such he
is not permitted to carry on a business competing with that
of the partnership.59 Other fiduciaries, such as trustees or
agents, undoubtedly would be under similar restrictions.
Even part-time agents are permitted to engage in other
enterprises only if it is not detrimental to the employers'
interests.60 In one rather unusual case both plaintiff and
defendant claimed that each was sole proprietor of a busi-
ness and that the other was merely an employee.61 The
court held that the real owner was entitled to an injunc-
tion and enjoined the agent from interfering with the busi-
ness.
VII. REPRESENTATION OF ADVERSE INTERESTS
A fiduciary's duty of loyalty to the beneficiary will not
permit him to act for a person who has an interest adverse
to that of the beneficiary. While he is employed in his
fiduciary capacity, his entire energies must be devoted to
the advancement of the beneficiary's legitimate interests.
The results flowing from this breach of a fiduciary's
duty are not uniform. In those cases in which the bene-
ficiary must, of necessity, rely upon the fiduciary's judg-
ment the transactions have been rescinded without the
necessity of showing that they were unfair to the benefi-
11 Debnam v. Simonson, 124 Md. 354, 92 A. 782 (1914). This case may
be an example of the choice of the wrong remedy. The suit was brought
for conspiracy to interfere with contractual rights. As the Court pointed
out, the plaintiff had no contract at the time.
59 Crownfleld v. Phillips, 125 Md. 1, 92 A. 1033, A. C. 1916 E. 991 (1915).
60 Jaffray v. King, 34 Md. 217 (1871) ; Hippodrome Co. v. Lewis, 130 Md.
154, 100 A. 78 (1917).
"1 Lord v. Smith, 109 Md. 42, 71 A. 430 (1908).
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ciary. Thus a judgment by default, which was obtained
because an attorney representing both a surety and a prin-
cipal withdrew general issue pleas and entered the judg-
ment to the use of the surety, was set aside on the ground
that it was impossible for the attorney to represent ad-
verse interests.2 The same result was reached in a case
in which an attorney represented a widow to negotiate a
settlement of her husband's estate with her step-children,
when the attorney's wife was one of the step-children. 3
However, in cases where an attorney deals with the
client directly, the Court of Appeals has been content mere-
ly to place upon him the burden of proving that the trans-
action was fair to the client." The distinction between
these cases seems to be that in the second situation the
client necessarily knows that the attorney is acting on his
own behalf and therefore does not rely exclusively upon
the attorney's judgment.
The same rules are applied in cases dealing with agents.
If an agent acts for an adverse party, including himself,
without the principal's knowledge, the transaction will un-
doubtedly be voidable at the option of the principal.6 5 On
the other hand if the principal has knowledge that the
agent's interests are adverse, the transaction will be avoid-
ed only if the agent fails to prove that it was fair.6 Of
course, if the principal consents to the agent's representa-
tion of an adverse party, he cannot thereafter complain. 7
In a number of cases these principles have been applied
to suits brought by real estate agents to recover commis-
sions. Such an agent who attempts to represent adverse
principals is not permitted to recover commissions from
Martindale v. Brock, 41 Md. 571 (1875).
Derlin v. Derlin, 142 Md. 352, 121 A. 27 (1923).
6, Merryman v. Euler, 59 Md. 588, 43 A. R. 564 (1883) ; Buechner v. Good-
man & Glick, 197 A. 586 (Md. 1938). Cf. Etzel v. Duncan, 112 Md. 346,
76 A. 493 (1910).
::Cf. De Crette v. Mohler, 147 Md. 108, 127 A. 639 (1925).6 Highberger v. Stiffier, 21 Md. 338, 83 A. D. 593 (1864) ; Todd v. Grove,
33 Md. 188 (1870); Kerby v. Kerby, 57 Md. 345 (1882); Zimmerman v.
Bitner, 79 Md. 115, 28 A. 820 (1894) ; Reed v. Reed, 101 Md. 138, 60 A. 621
(1905); Horner v. Bell, 102 Md. 435, 62 A. 736 (1906); Zimmerman v.
Frushour, 108 Md. 115, 69 A. 796, 16 L. R. A. N. S. 1087 (1908).
67 Liggett Co. v. Rose, 152 Md. 146, 136 A. 641 (1927) ; Balto. Am. Ins. Co.
v. Ulman, 165 Md. 630, 170 A. 202 (1934).
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both."' Obviously the same result is reached where. the
agent either buys or sells the property himself.6 9
Although the fiduciary may be guilty of a breach of
duty, the beneficiary alone may take advantage, of it. A
third person to whom the fiduciary owes no duty may not
defend his. own wrongdoing on the ground that the fiduciary
has represented adverse interests." The fiduciary's duty
extends only to the particular transaction for which he is
employed. He may deal with the beneficiary freely and
at arm's length after the fiduciary relationship has ter-
minated. 1
One apparent exception to these principles is found in
the case of corporate directors who deal with themselves
as directors of another corporation. The Court of Appeals
has repeatedly held that there is no presumption of unfair-
ness or illegality -simply because corporations who are
parties to a transaction have common directors or stock-
holders. 72  In such cases the directors' duty to each of the
corporations may conflict, but the temptation to disregard
their duty because of self interest is not so evident. The
rule is otherwise when the directors deal with themselves.73
VIII. OTHER BREACHES OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Finally, there are certain cases which do not seem to
fit into the classifications here employed, in which the Court
has recognized the fiduciary's duty of loyalty. In most
of them the facts presented an a fortiori case for the ap-
plication of these principles. Directors of a corporation
" Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158, 20 A. R. 66 (1874) ; Blake v. Stump, 73
Md. 160, 20 A. 788, 10 L. R. A. 103 (1890).
" Slagle v. Russell, 114 Md. 418, 80 A. 164 (1911) ; Wieghardt v. Wagner,
140 Md. 188, 117 A. 330 (1922).
70 Jaeger v. Shea, 130 Md. 1, 99 A. 954 (1917).
71 Schwartze v. Yearly, 31 Md. 270 (1869); Brown v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 87 Md. 377, 40 A. 256 (1898) ; Lucas v. Crenshaw, 116 Md. 455, 82 A.
446 (1911) ; Owners Realty Co. v. Cook, 123 Md. 1, 90 A. 602 (1914). But
the fiduciary has the burden of proving that the relationship has termi-
nated, Woodcock v. Dennis, 199 A. 845 (Md. 1938).
72 Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419 (1881) ; Davis v. U. S. E. P. & L. Co., 77
Md. 35, 25 A. 982 (1893) ; Shaw v. Davis, 78 Md. 308, 28 A. 619, 23 L. R. A.
294 (1894) ; Hagerstown Mfg. Co. v. Keedy, 91 Md. 430, 46 A. 965 (1900) ;
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 87 A. 1062 (1913) ; Homer v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 141 A. 425 (1928).
7' See cases supra n. 11.
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and the owners of a majority of its stock, who induced
minority stockholders to exchange their common stock for
preferred stock without disclosing that the corporation
had earned large profits and would pay correspondingly
large dividends on the common stock, were held to have
violated their fiduciary duty.4 Officers of a bank which
was hopelessly insolvent who permitted the payment of a
large check drawn on the bank by a corporation owned by
one of them, and the payment of a note owed by the bank
and endorsed by three of them, were likewise held to have
neglected their trust.75
IX. CONCLUSION
In an early case Chancellor Hanson, in setting aside a
sale made by an administrator to himself, said:
"The Chancellor earnestly wishes it understood,
that in his opinion no rule of this Court, adopted for
the prevention of fraud, ought to be relaxed; but that,
on the contrary, rules against fraud ought to be as
strict as possible. He has known more than one in-
stance where a trustee has openly purchased, and there
was no reason to doubt the fairness of his conduct,
and yet this Court would not ratify the sale." 1 6
The Court of Appeals, in a recent case, said :77
"This question is governed by a broad and most
salutary equitable principle, which may be thus stated:
that a trustee, or one acting in a fiduciary capacity, is
not permitted to place himself in such position that
the interest of the beneficiary and his own personal
interest do or may conflict; and the question of wheth-
er or not such a position has resulted in a benefit or
loss to the beneficiary is not permitted to be inquired
into. " I
The Court of Appeals has been consistent in applying
these principles. Fiduciaries are treated as a class apart.
7' MacGill v. MacGill, 135 Md. 384, 109 A. 72 (1919).
5 James Clark Co. v. Colton, 91 Md. 195, 46 A. 386, 49 L. R. A. 698 (1900).
"' Conway v. Green, 1 H. & J. 151, 152 (1801).
7, Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 300, 173 A. 191 (1934).
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Their actions have been condemned not only when they
are unfair to the beneficiary, but also when they are likely
to result in unfairness. In this respect the law's appraisal
of human nature is skeptical in the extreme. A fiduciary
is not permitted to place himself in a position in which
there is any likelihood that his actions will be affected by
self interest. We generally think of trustees as fiduciaries,
yet there are many others who occupy this relationship.
The same principles which are applied to trustees are ap-
plied to these other fiduciaries, even if the rigor of their
application is lessened somewhat by the varying dependence
of the beneficiary on the fiduciary's judgment. In all cases
the standard required of the fiduciary is definitely higher
than that required of others whose dealings are consid-
ered by the Courts.
